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shaPing iMMigraTion law Through a
business-law Model
Mitch Reber1

B

eginning in January 2011, Aroldo Castillo-Serrano, an illegal
alien from Guatemala, created a human trafficking organization that convinced Guatemalan teens to enter the United States illegally by promising them that the organization could
get them into school once they were in the country.2 Once Aroldo
smuggled the hopeful teens into the country, he enlisted them as
indentured servants at an egg farm called Trillium Farms in Marion,
Ohio.3 Aroldo was able to continue this illegal organization for three
years, and though he was finally caught, this story exemplifies an
individual’s ability to take advantage of the inefficiencies that exist
in federal immigration law.4 The question is, does this problem stem
from the federal or state level?
Traditionally, laws concerning immigration have always resided
under federal jurisdiction. The Sixth Article of the U.S. Constitution
includes a clause that states that the “Constitution, and the Laws of
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the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”5 In line
with the Supremacy Clause in the Constitution, immigration law
is controlled by two acts: the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 (INA) and the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA).6 These two acts guide most immigration law in the United
States and are monitored under federal jurisdiction.
When functioning effectively, immigration law should regulate
the processes of entering the United States from another country and
define the rights of immigrants once inside the country. When these
laws are followed, problems such as decreased wages, decreased national security, and increased crime rates can be avoided.7 However,
statistics over the past ten years show that federal immigration laws
have not been functioning as efficiently as they should be.8
Federal inefficiency leaves state governments with a heavier
burden to regulate illegal immigrants. Though states have attempted
to create laws that will help govern illegal immigrants within their
own borders, it is not clear which laws states can and cannot pass due
to Supreme Court decisions dealing with state-produced immigration laws.
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This article will show that to more efficiently solve the problem of
illegal immigration the federal government should reinterpret federal
immigration laws, namely IRCA, and adopt a business-type model.
This business-type model would allow states to create immigration
laws that are constitutionally sound and enable states to effectively
regulate illegal immigration within their respective borders.
The article will proceed in the following manner. First, the article will present a brief background for each case to be discussed
along with background information on business law. In Section II,
an argument for state-produced immigration law will be offered.
Section III will then describe how a business-type model would be
beneficial. Section IV will show that only the IRCA, not the Constitution, will need to be reinterpreted. Section V will then analyze two
cases, showing how the Supreme Court’s rulings are too restrictive
and confuse state legislations. Finally, Section VI, will describe how
the business-type model could be implemented on a federal level.

I. BACKGROUND
During the same time that Aroldo Serrano began his human
trafficking organization (January 2011), state legislations in Arizona, Utah, Alabama, Indiana, and South Carolina attempted to create
immigration legislation to better regulate illegal immigrants within
their respective borders.9 Due to intense litigation, Arizona and Utah
are the only states that actually enacted their laws.10 However, the
number of states that wished to create immigration laws during this
time showcases the motivation amongst states to create laws regarding immigration.11 This article will analyze Arizona’s Legal Arizona
Workers Act and SB 1070, as well as the Supreme Court cases and
other litigation brought up against each law.
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Arizona enacted SB 1070 in 2010.12 This law included four sections that were eventually argued before the Supreme Court: Section 2B required law enforcement officers to determine immigration
status during a lawful stop; Section 3 created a state crime for the
failure to apply for or carry federally issued alien registration papers;
Section 5 made it unlawful for an unauthorized alien to solicit, apply
for, or perform work; and Section 6 authorized the warrantless arrest
of a person when there is probable cause to believe the person has
committed a public offense that makes said person removable from
the United States.13 The Supreme Court ruled on July 28, 2010, and
stated that Sections 3, 5, and 6 were either precluded by federal law
or unconstitutional, leaving only Section 2B to be enacted by the
state.14 The court’s ruling showcases one example of how the federal
court’s review of state laws regarding immigration greatly restricts
the state’s ability to freely create legislation in this area.
Arizona issued an earlier immigration law called the Legal Arizona Workers Act (LAWA) in 2007.15 This law requires businesses
to verify an employee’s ability to legally work in the United States
through E-Verify, a program produced by Congress. Failure to comply with this law could result in the company’s business license
being suspended or revoked entirely. In Chamber of Commerce v.
Whiting, the Supreme Court found that this law was constitutionally
sound and did not preclude federal immigration law.16 This case exemplifies the intense litigation involved in passing a state-produced
immigration law, even when the ruling is in favor of that law. This
article will later show how the intensity of litigation surrounding
immigration law is detrimental to the states and that a business-type
model would be an effective way of improving the illegal immigration problem.
12

Id.

13

Ariz. S. B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Ariz. 2010).

14

Arizona v. United States, 132 U.S. 2492, 2501 (2012).

15

Immigration Policy Project, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, (Aug.
27, 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/omnibus-immigration-legislation.aspx.

16

Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 583 (2011).

shaPing iMMigration laW through a businEss-laW ModEl

105

Business or commerce law in the United States is governed by
both federal and state jurisdiction.17 Under the Commerce Clause
of the U.S. Constitution, the federal government has the power to
regulate three types of commerce: commerce with Native American
Tribes, foreign commerce, and interstate commerce.18 The states retain the power to regulate intrastate commerce and can enact laws
that regulate the conduct of business within the state. However, states
may not create business laws that “unduly burden” interstate commerce.19 So, laws that affect business conduct or processes that occur
across state lines or outside state borders would be unconstitutional.
One example of a state properly using its authority to create
business law is when the State of California passed Proposition 65.20
The proposition holds businesses to a higher standard when producing and selling products that contain substances that cause cancer
(as determined by the state).21 Since the proposition exists only in
California and does not unduly burden interstate commerce, the
proposition is justified and constitutional. This article will show that
an immigration law modeled similarly to a business law would be an
effective alternative to improve the illegal immigration problem that
currently exists.
One key term that must be defined in this article is the aforementioned “business-type model”—also referred to as the business
law model. A “business-type model” simply refers to the process
in which business or commerce is regulated in the United States.
Again, the federal government retains jurisdiction over interstate
commerce and foreign commerce and the states retain jurisdiction
over intrastate commerce.22 Immigration law modeled after business
17

Henry R. Cheeseman, Business Law: Legal Environment, Online Commerce, Business Ethics, and International Issues (7 ed. 2010).

18

Id. at 58.

19

Id. at 62.

20

Proposition 65 in Plain Language, OEHHA (2016), http://oehha.ca.gov/
proposition-65/general-info/proposition-65-plain-language (last visited
Dec. 6, 2016).

21

Id.

22

Cheeseman, supra note 17.

106

BYU Prelaw review, vol. 31, 2017

law would allow states to create better immigration laws within their
own borders. The states would also be unable to create immigration
law that affected immigration across states or with foreign nations.

II. BENEFITS TO STATE IMMIGRATION LAW
The success of the Arizona laws previously mentioned demonstrate that when states are able to create and pass immigration laws,
illegal immigration can be regulated more efficiently. For example,
after Arizona’s SB 1070 was passed, the illegal immigrant population in Arizona decreased from 470,000 to 350,000 between 2010
to 2012, according to the Department of Homeland Security.23 Currently, there are an estimated 244,000 illegal immigrants residing
in Arizona.24 Though SB 1070 was heavily restricted by the U.S.
Supreme Court, the law still helped decrease the overall population
of illegal immigrants in the state by about 48 percent. Given the
stagnant level of illegal immigrants across the United States over
the past five years, the sharp decrease in Arizona can serve as one
measure of the law’s success.
Had the bill remained in its entirety, Arizona may have had even
greater success in reducing the overall population of illegal immigrants in the state. SB 1070’s Section 5, for example, made the act of
soliciting or applying for work while not authorized to do so a state
crime.25 This section would have worked hand in hand with LAWA
to highly restrict job acquisition for those seeking work illegally.
LAWA, which focused on illegal immigrants in the workplace,
also helped reduce the number of illegal immigrants in the state. By
requiring businesses to verify all employees through E-Verify, the
23
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difficulty in acquiring a job as an illegal immigrant in Arizona has
increased dramatically.26 Essentially, this increased difficulty in job
acquisition makes the state far less attractive to illegal immigrants,
resulting in many illegal immigrants leaving the state altogether.27
Additionally, LAWA works to protect against other immigration-related crimes—for example, the trafficking crimes of Aroldo
Castillo-Serrano. If the farm employing the teenage boys had been
subject to a law similar to LAWA, the farm would have been required
to verify every employee through E-Verify. The teenage boys would
have been identified as illegal immigrants and their time as indentured servants would not have occurred. LAWA is successful in both
helping reduce the number of illegal immigrants within a state and in
helping prevent certain crimes related to illegal immigration.
The success of SB 1070 and the LAWA does not come without
costs. The two laws are attributed to negatively affecting the business market in Arizona. Generally, increasing the legal burden on
firms increases operating costs as well, making Arizona a more difficult state to do business in.28 This deters business owners from investing and creating new ventures in Arizona, consequently slowing
economic growth across multiple industries.29
Despite the economic costs of enforcing SB 1070 and LAWA,
there may be greater cost in allowing illegal immigrants to remain
where they are. One study performed in 2013 found that illegal immigrants cost the United States about $113 billion—an average of

26
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$1,117 per household.30 This means that U.S. taxpayers, both rich and
poor, pay for illegal immigrants’ health care, education, and public
services.31 So, though there are certain business-related costs to enforcing Arizona’s SB 1070 and LAWA, the laws seek to minimize
economic costs caused by illegal immigrants and protect citizen’s
tax dollars. Again, the 48 percent decrease in illegal immigrant population within the state shows the success of these two laws.

III. BUSINESS LAW AS A MODEL
The success of the two laws in Arizona allows for an argument to
be made for state-produced immigration law that resembles the model
of U.S. business law. Under this model, states would be able to create laws that regulate immigration within their borders. Federal jurisdiction would then be reserved for immigration issues that occurred
“among the several states,” or across state and national borders.32
Some of the benefits that occur under the business law model
would translate over to the realm of immigration. First and foremost,
competition occurs frequently between states that enact different
business laws, ultimately leading to better environments for businesses to flourish. For example, more than 65 percent of Fortune 500
companies incorporate in the state of Delaware because corporate
laws are simply better there.33 The Delaware Court of Chancery considerably speeds up legal proceedings for corporations. Delaware
as a state is very small and does not naturally attract as many
30

The Fiscal Burden of Illegal Immigration on United States Taxpayers
(2013), Federation for American Immigration Reform, (2013), http://
www.fairus.org/publications/the-fiscal-burden-of-illegal-immigration-onunited-states-taxpayers.

31

Robert Rector & Jason Richwine, The Fiscal Cost of Unlawful Immigrants and Amnesty to the U.S. Taxpayer, The Heritage Foundation,
(2013), http://www.heritage.org/immigration/report/the-fiscal-cost-unlawful-immigrants-and-amnesty-the-us-taxpayer.

32

U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.

33

Delaware Corporation, Benefits of a delaware CorPoration, Harvard
Business Services. Inc., https://www.delawareinc.com/corporation/ (last
visited Jan 26, 2017).

shaPing iMMigration laW through a businEss-laW ModEl

109

businesses as larger states such as Texas. So, to influence business
growth within the state, Delaware made it easier for businesses to
exist and operate.34
The existence of competition between states created a great environment for corporations in the state of Delaware. Similarly, competition between states could also solve immigration problems more
efficiently. Competition between states will force states to look for
the best solution regarding illegal immigrants within their borders.
Second, if immigration law took on a model similar to business
law, the states would be able to better create immigration laws that
are more state-specific. Different industries vary from state to state
depending on geography, resources, and a number of other factors.
The technology industry in California is vastly different from the
oil and gas industry in Texas; the laws surrounding these industries
are very specific and complex.35 To compensate for these major differences, laws are passed that are specific to each state and industry.
Similarly, immigration issues differ from state to state and may be
best served by state-specific immigration laws rather than all-encompassing federal laws. The severity of immigration issues also
differs from state to state and, under a business law model, so could
state immigration policies.

IV. REINTERPRETING IRCA
One potential counterargument to implementing a model similar
to the business law model derives from the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, which allows Congress to preempt most state law and
typically includes immigration.36 However, the Supremacy Clause
simply states that federal law is the supreme law of the land.37 The
clause does not explicitly state that the federal government reserves
34
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all power over immigration law.38 Congress does have the power to
“withdraw specified powers from the States by enacting a statute
containing an express preemption provision”—which is the case
with IRCA.39 Thus, to enact a business law immigration model, it
would not be the Constitution that would need reinterpreting, just
IRCA, which currently withholds power from the states.
Due to the number of states wishing to create immigration law,
it may in fact be time for a reinterpretation of IRCA. In Arizona v.
United States, the majority opinion states, “Although [Section] 5(C)
attempts to achieve one of the same goals as federal law—the deterrence of unlawful employment—it involves a conflict in the method
of enforcement.”40 The opinion says that the conflict of enforcement
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress.”41 As stated, the objective
of Congress—at least in part—is to deter unlawful employment.
However, this goal has not been achieved to the satisfaction of
the states; this can be seen through the dramatic increase of illegal
immigrants who have entered the country since the creation of IRCA
in 1986.42 Since illegal immigrants are not entering the country for
leisure or vacation time, it is safe to assume that they are entering for
the prospect of better work; thus, the goal to deter unlawful employment has not been achieved. Hence, the states are seeking to elaborate on federal laws to achieve this goal, and this situation thereby
calls for reinterpretation of IRCA.

38
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V. RESTRICTION AND CONFUSION FROM SUPREME COURT CASES
Another variable that could delay a business-type model from
being implemented stems from recent Supreme Court rulings on
state-produced immigration law. Since federal law currently preempts state law with regard to immigration, any immigration-related
law produced by a state is subject to litigation on the ground that it
is preempted by federal law.43 Additionally, the Supreme Court cases Arizona v. United States and Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting
present two different problems created by the rulings in each case.
Namely, Arizona v. United States showcases the restrictive environment established by Congress and the Supreme Court in deciding
immigration related cases and Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting
elicits an incoherent ruling that creates confusion for states seeking
to create immigration law.
First, the Supreme Court ruling in Arizona v. United States highlights the substantial restriction placed on states that wish to create
immigration law. This restriction stems from Congress’s all-encompassing power with regard to immigration. For example, in the Opinion of the Court for this case, Section 3 of SB 1070 was declined
because the section was preempted by federal laws governing alien
registration.44 The opinion states that “[w]here Congress occupies an
entire field, as it has in the field of alien registration, even complementary state regulation is impermissible. Field pre-emption reflects
a congressional decision to foreclose any state regulation in the area,
even if it is parallel to federal standards.”45 Even when a state is creating immigration law that is “complementary” and “parallel” to federal
standards, the law is considered impermissible if Congress occupies
an entire field. This example proves the restrictive environment in
43
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which states must maneuver when attempting to better regulate illegal immigrants.
Second, Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting produced a ruling
that may cause confusion and create problems moving forward in
state-produced immigration law. In this case, the Supreme Court upheld LAWA because “the Court reads IRCA’s saving clause—which
preserves from pre-emption state ‘licensing and similar laws,’ 8 U.
S. C. §1324a(h)(2)—to permit States to determine for themselves
whether someone has employed an unauthorized alien so long as
they do so in conjunction with licensing sanctions.”46 Under IRCA,
states are permitted to pass laws as long as they fall under “licensing” guidelines. This provides an undesirable caveat in state-produced immigration law.
Though IRCA may inhibit states from producing some immigration law, as long as the state punishes businesses, specifically their business licenses, then the state will be able to pass
immigration-related law. The ability to create licensing law takes
the focus off of those in the country illegally and places a heavy
burden on corporations. However, some states that face severe immigration problems may use this ambiguity to control rising illegalimmigration populations.47
The issues and confusion raised by the discussed Supreme Court
rulings can be avoided through reinterpretation of IRCA. Once IRCA
has been rewritten or replaced, the states will be able to produce immigration laws without the threat of litigation on the grounds that the
law is preempted by federal jurisdiction. Ultimately, the rulings in
Arizona v. United States and Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting will
have little to no effect on the new business-type model.
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VI. ENACTMENT OF STATE-LED IMMIGRATION LAW
There are a few different options to implement this businesstype model into federal and state laws. First, the Supreme Court
could come together and vote in favor of state-produced laws, thus
changing the courts’ outlook on such laws and presenting states with
greater maneuverability in immigration law. Second, the Executive
Branch could push to reform immigration law. Third, Congress could
address IRCA and reform the statute to allow for state-produced immigration law as long as it is deemed constitutional. This may be a
quicker method of implementing the business-type model and avoids
litigation costs to each state attempting to produce immigration law.
The quickest way to implement the business model would be
through the third option listed above: Congress should address IRCA
and reform the statute. This option is quicker than option two because
Congress currently holds the keys to immigration law; Congress can
quickly turn over the keys to the states through a reinterpretation of
present federal immigration law—namely IRCA.48 This option also
avoids the litigation that would take place when undertaking the first
option. States would not need laws to make their way all the way up
to the Supreme Court before being approved.

VII. CONCLUSION
The stagnant illegal immigration population, Aroldo’s trafficking case, and individual state desire to create immigration law call
for a new model of immigration law in the United States. Under the
current model, Congress must account for varying problems in each
of the 50 states. Congress must devise a system that works across the
board and, so far, it has been unable to do so.
A business-type model for immigration law could be easily implemented without requiring reinterpretation of the Constitution. It
would allow for the states to compete, and would create laws that address state-specific problems. The success of reducing the illegal immigrant population to an adequate amount would be more efficiently
48
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achieved. Immigration law should be modeled after business law;
the states should have the ability to create laws that govern within
their respective borders, while the federal government retains power
over interstate and foreign occurrences.

